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USING THE L AND TO CONTROL THE SEA?
Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile
Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang

F

or China, the ability to prevent a U.S. carrier strike group from intervening
in the event of a Taiwan Strait crisis is critical. Beijing’s immediate strategic
concerns have been defined with a high level of clarity. The Chinese are interested in achieving an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability because it offers them the prospect of limiting the ability of other nations, particularly the
United States, to exert military influence on China’s maritime periphery, which
contains several disputed zones of core strategic importance to Beijing. ASBMs
are regarded as a means by which technologically limited developing countries
can overcome by asymmetric means their qualitative inferiority in conventional
combat platforms, because the gap between offense and defense is the greatest
here.
Today, China may be closer than ever to attaining this capability. In addition
to numerous outside reports suggesting Chinese efforts in this area, technical
and operationally focused discussions on the topic are
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with profound consequences for deterrence, military operations, arms control,
and the balance of power in the western Pacific.
Although open sources do not claim that China currently has a proven ASBM
capability, U.S. government sources have stated consistently that Beijing is developing an ASBM based on a variant of the land-based DF-21/CSS-5 mediumrange ballistic missile (MRBM). The DF-21’s 1,500-kilometer-plus range could
hold ships at risk in a large maritime area, far beyond Taiwan and into the western Pacific.1 According to a 2006 unclassified assessment by the U.S. Office of
Naval Intelligence, “China is equipping theater ballistic missiles [TBMs] with
maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) with radar or IR [infrared] seekers to
provide the accuracy necessary to attack a ship at sea.”2 If viable, such missiles,
with “high-reentry speed (Mach 10–12) [and] radical maneuvers,” would be extraordinarily difficult to defend against, whatever ballistic missile defense the
United States might deploy.3 Targeting a carrier with submunitions could enable
China to render it operationally ineffective without sinking it, thereby achieving
its objectives with a (perceived) lower risk of escalation. If not countered effectively, the very impression of such a risk might deter carrier strike groups from
entering the region in the first place (figure 1).
FIGURE 1
MAXIMUM RANGE OF A DF-21/CSS-5 ASBM FROM LAUNCH LOCATIONS
IN MAINLAND CHINA

Note the large area potentially covered, far beyond Taiwan and the first island chain into the western Pacific. This covers nearly all the maritime areas in which China has
disputed claims, and provides a substantial strategic buffer zone for most. As published in Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic
of China 2009, Annual Report to Congress, p. 29.
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China has also been working on a sophisticated network of ground- and
space-based sensors, including over-the-horizon radars and electronic signals
detection equipment. While finding an aircraft carrier has been likened to finding a needle in a haystack, this particular needle has a large radar cross section,
emits radio waves, and is surrounded by airplanes. Simply looking for the biggest radar reflection to target will tend to locate the largest ship—and the largest
ship will usually be an aircraft carrier.4
While the ASBM issue has been discussed for nearly a decade in Chinese official reports and commentaries in various venues, it has only recently garnered
widespread public attention in the United States, primarily in reaction to two
Chinese articles; 5 these articles were recently translated, posted, and analyzed
on an influential blog affi liated with the U.S. Naval Institute, then covered widely by the media.6 But these articles represent merely the tip of a much larger iceberg. In what follows, we will survey open-source Chinese writings on ASBMs to
investigate and assess Chinese views on developing, fielding, and ultimately (in
a worst-case scenario) using such a system.
EARLY CONCEPTIONS
For over three decades, Chinese leaders and strategists have been thinking of
using land-based missiles to hit threatening targets at sea. In 1972, Vice Premier
Zhang Chunqiao had significant influence over China’s national decision making as one of the Gang of Four, a faction led by Chairman Mao Zedong’s wife,
Jiang Qing. In an important speech in April of that year he declared, “We are
continentalists. Now guided missiles are well developed. Installed on shore, they
can hit any target, and there is no need to build a big navy.”7 By focusing on a
specific missile technology, as China had done so successfully since the 1950s,
Zhang apparently believed, it would be possible to achieve a transformative strategic effect while devoting China’s limited resources to more pressing priorities. Zhang’s political career did not survive Mao’s passing, and in the ensuing
decades China took significant steps toward building the “big navy” that Zhang
decried. Meanwhile, however, ballistic missile development remained a key Chinese focus. The American MaRVed Pershing II TBM—deployed in 1983—was
studied intensively by the Chinese beginning in the late 1970s, with over fifty
related commentaries appearing on this subject.8 Such articles faded from more
serious technical publications by the early 1990s, possibly because of the retirement of the Pershing IIs following ratification of the U.S.-Soviet IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in May 1988, as well as any efforts to avoid
drawing attention to Chinese application of such technology. In any case, the
Pershing II inspired Chinese research in this area and has been cited in Chinese
sources as influencing the development of China’s family of ballistic missiles.9
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In recent years, Beijing has sought to threaten credibly U.S. military access to
strategically vital areas along China’s maritime periphery, particularly those surrounding Taiwan. Despite progress toward this end, however, Chinese naval and
maritime analysts have written consistently that their nation’s naval capabilities
are still insufficient to address critical operational threats. Civilian leaders appear to have supported substantial naval development in keeping with China’s
commercial maritime revolution but continue to prioritize national economic
development over military expansion and wish to avoid emulating Soviet mistakes by devoting an unsustainable portion of national resources to the latter.
For all these reasons, a widespread but targeted military modernization effort
is under way that draws on earlier People’s Liberation Army (PLA) traditions of
pursuing military objectives from a position of relative weakness. As part of this
larger effort, a more balanced version of Zhang’s “vision” of ground-launched
antiship missile development is apparently being pursued. What must be emphasized is that the idea of striking a ship from land is not new and that the idea
of “using the land to control the sea” (以陆制海) in this way is very appealing to
China, given its geostrategic situation.10
This effort has assumed new urgency as part of a larger effort to deter U.S.
carrier strike groups from intervening in a potential conflict over Taiwan. If
China deploys a successful ASBM in the near future, rapid progress in its development will be traced in part to the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, which further
underscored Chinese feelings of helplessness against American naval power.
The deployment of the USS Nimitz (CVN 68) and Independence (CV 62) carrier battle groups in response to Chinese missile tests and military exercises in
the Taiwan Strait was a move that China could not counter.11 We cannot know
at this time how the events of 1995–96 affected the precise calculations of Chinese leaders, but they seem to have given a major boost to PLA development in
general, and PLA Navy (PLAN) development in particular.12 Moreover, there is
specific evidence that a new impetus was given to ASBM-related research and
development at this time (figure 2). As Colonel Larry Wortzel (Ret.), U.S. Army
attaché in Beijing from 1995 to 1997, recently testified, “The first time a senior
Chinese military officer of the General Staff Department mentioned ballistic
missiles attacking carriers was after our two carriers showed up, and he put his
arm around my shoulder and said we’re going to sink your carriers with ballistic
missiles, and we had a long conversation about it. I don’t know if they were doing
research before that, but . . . the first time it got thrown in my face was 1996.”13
DISCUSSIONS OF ASBMS IN THE CHINESE LITERATURE: AN OVERVIEW
Given the sensitivity of the issue, relevant statements on ASBM development by
top Chinese leaders are currently lacking. But there are ample data to consider
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FIGURE 2
CHINESE CONCEPTION OF ASBM TARGET DETECTION AND TRACKING, CA. 2000

Source: Chen Haidong et al., “Study of a Guidance Scheme for Reentry Vehicles Attacking Slowly Moving Targets,” p. 6, fig. 1.

at other levels. Chinese writings on ASBMs in the open-source literature can
be divided into three broad categories. In descending level of authoritativeness,
these include
1. PLA doctrinal publications describing how ASBMs might be used in operational scenarios
2. Specialized technical analyses of specific aspects of such weapons and their
supporting infrastructure
3. Generalist deliberations and didactic discussions on the technical and operational feasibility of such weapons.

The first category comprises official military doctrinal publications. These
sources of guidance for PLA personnel illustrate how PLA analysts are thinking
about using ASBMs in actual operational scenarios. They are typically written
by leading scholars at institutions of professional military education, under the
editorial guidance of high-ranking active-duty officers, or sometimes by retired
officers themselves. Several doctrinal publications of the PLA as a whole and
of the Second Artillery Corps (China’s strategic missile force) discuss a variety
of ways in which to use conventional ballistic missiles to deter carrier strike
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groups (CSGs). This demonstrates that such a possibility is taken seriously by
the PLA and suggests that relevant programs are under development, though it
leaves unclear to what extent the PLA has mastered the necessary technical and
operational capabilities.
The second category consists of focused technical analyses of specific systems and operations both explicitly and potentially relevant to ASBMs, such as
calculations of the maneuvering range of reentry vehicles;14 another example is
the suppression of sea-surface backscattering for maritime surveillance radars.15
These are written by military and civilian technical analysts, whose names and
institutions are typically identified, for an audience in their relevant subfields.
Compared to articles on other existing weapons systems (e.g., antiship cruise
missiles [ASCMs]), these tend to be theoretical papers utilizing mathematical
models, and it is not clear how readily they can be translated into concrete engineering solutions. But some analysts claim that the theories involved have indeed been proved correct, and actual solutions may be contained in other documents. Together, these first two categories of sources offer good indicators that
China is pursuing ASBM development seriously; sophisticated intellectual work
in doctrine and technology would underpin any such efforts.
The third category consists of generalist deliberations on the feasibility of
such weapons. These are written by a variety of naval and maritime analysts
(many unidentified), for a broad range of military, defense industrial, and popular audiences, some perhaps for educational purposes. Tremendous disagreement can be encountered in these sources, even on fundamental issues; they
demonstrate a range of opinion and debate. More than a few contain technical
errors and mistaken assumptions; many, however, offer very specific details.16
The authoritativeness of these sources is frequently difficult to determine, although many of the commentators are clearly technical experts.17
While there are clearly differences among the sources, then, it is important
to note that areas exist that they all collectively treat as conventional wisdom,
issues on which there is no disagreement regardless of forum, institutional affi liation, or individual viewpoint. Chinese commentators agree that an ASBM,
if it is to be developed, would be based on an upgraded version of an existing Chinese MRBM, such as the DF-21/CSS-5.18 A DF-21D variant is reportedly
closest to an antiship version;19 some Chinese writings say this of the C version;20
others refer to future modifications (e.g., a DF-21E).21 The prototype for such a
weapon is generally held to be the Pershing II TBM; this is an unusual instance
in which Chinese analysts do not see Russia as a model for weapons development. At a strategic level, Chinese assessments generally concur that ASBMs,
if realized in practice, would offer a variety of operational effects and value for
Chinese maritime strategy—particularly vis-à-vis Taiwan. If this vision were
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achieved, it could impose significant restrictions on U.S. naval operations during a Taiwan crisis, especially as there are complementary discussions in Chinese
writings about holding U.S. theater land bases—such as those on Okinawa—at
risk. Acknowledgment in Taiwan and the United States of such a change in the
military balance, Chinese observers believe, would deter Taiwan independence
and encourage cross-strait reintegration on Beijing’s terms. Finally, there is also
general agreement as to which are the key technical challenges, including target
acquisition and terminal guidance.22 To be sure, there is little discussion in the
Chinese literature about specific Chinese capabilities in these areas, only general
statements of feasibility and implicit assumptions in doctrinal publications that
ASBMs are available for use or will be soon.
FIGURE 3
SIMILAR TECHNOLOGY? AMERICA’S PERSHING II AND CHINA’S DF-15/CSS-6 AND DF-21/
CSS-5 MISSILES

According to Chinese sources, a Chinese DF-21 ASBM would be based in part on the U.S. Pershing II (left), as is the DF-15 short-range ballistic missile (center).
The U.S. Pershing II has adjustable control fins on its reentry vehicle for terminal maneuver. Positively identified photos of a CSS-5 outside its launch canister
are not known to exist. But the DF-15B missile pictured here has a reentry vehicle virtually identical to the Pershing II’s. Based on the strong visual resemblance, it is possible that the DF-15B employs terminal maneuvering technology similar to that of the Pershing II. The reentry vehicle that China obviously has
here could easily be mated with a variant of the DF-21/CSS-5 booster (right), which might then produce an effective ASBM. (Photos used with permission
from China Defense Forum)
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Doctrinal Sources
Apparently authoritative doctrinal writings already describe in some detail how
ASBMs might be employed. Such references have been hitherto ignored in Western scholarship; this is a case of potentially important information hiding in
plain sight. There are volumes devoted to missions for the Second Artillery as
part of PLA joint doctrine; the authors were unable to find any doctrinal writings suggesting that other services (e.g., the PLAN) would be responsible for
using conventional ballistic missiles to hit targets at sea.23
Three volumes deserve special scrutiny as perhaps the most authoritative
writings available on PLA doctrine concerning the use of ballistic missiles in
operational and tactical scenarios.24 Of these, The Science of Campaigns and
The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns have each been “printed and distributed to all military forces, colleges, and universities as a training and learning
reference.”25
The Science of Campaigns was written by researchers at China’s National Defense University. The 2006 edition, more sophisticated and joint in orientation
than its 2000 predecessor, offers a basic overview of conditions under which
conventional ballistic missiles might be used to “implement sea blockades” and
“capture localized campaign sea dominance” by “implementing missile firepower assault or firepower harassment attacks against important targets that
the enemy depends on for . . . sea-based maneuvering.” This would typically be
done as part of a joint campaign with such organizations as the PLAN and the
PLA Air Force, with which there is supposed to be “extremely close coordination,” although in unspecified contingencies the Second Artillery might operate
independently. Practical aspects, such as the imperative to “react rapidly” and
“control the rate of missile consumption,” are emphasized to support a sophisticated strategy aimed at “apply[ing] great psychological pressure on the enemy”
and making him think “that no rules apply, thereby achieving the maximum
effectiveness.”26
Even more relevant and sophisticated is The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns. Published by the PLA Press in March 2004 (but completed in May
2003), it likely serves as a high-level professional military education handbook
for campaign-level command personnel in the Second Artillery and the PLA in
general. Its chief editor and his deputy have considerable credibility and expertise as top PLA officials. The foreword by the headquarters of the PLA General
Staff further indicates that this book is the institutional position of the PLA as
a whole and hence has been accepted by China’s civilian leadership, at least in
general terms.27
How does the Second Artillery conceive of using ASBMs in operational scenarios? The 406-page document describes the use of ASBMs against carriers
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in some detail and without suggesting that such an approach is aspirational or
beset with insurmountable difficulties. In fact, in introducing the section describing their potential employment, it states that “conventional missile strike
groups” should be used as an “assassin’s mace” (or silver bullet)—a term commonly used in both PLA and less authoritative documents to describe weapons
that match Chinese strengths with an enemy’s weaknesses.28
The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns states that the Second Artillery will
work with the PLAN to “execute focused naval blockades” and “achieve command of the seas.”29 Approaching enemy CSGs are envisioned to be the principal
maritime targets, but “large vessels or large ship formations” more broadly are
mentioned as well.30 Coordination and precision are seen as essential for “deterring and blocking enemy carrier strike groups”;31 such “operational activities
need to be coordinated without the slightest difference in time.”32 Coordination
with the PLAN is also emphasized in the location of sea targets, as well as with
regard to the notification and demarcation of blockade areas: “the naval intelligence department should ‘relay promptly’ the information obtained by its reconnaissance about enemy ship activities to the Second Artillery campaign large
formation.”33 In particular, “information regarding carrier battle groups . . . should
be gathered on a real time basis.”34 Potential sources of “real-time target intelligence” include “military reconnaissance satellites, domestic and foreign remote
sensing satellites, and established satellite reconnaissance target image information processing systems.”35 While ASBMs are not mentioned explicitly in this
context, the need for “further real-time intelligence on the dynamic target” to
be obtained through “various measures and multiple channels” is recognized
vis-à-vis cruise missiles.36
A two-page section describes five ways to use ASBMs against carrier strike
groups, a centerpiece of “military intervention by a powerful enemy” and thus
the proper “focal point for attacks.”37 Such tactics as firing intimidation salvos,
destroying shipborne aircraft with submunitions, or disabling with electromagnetic pulses the sensor systems of Aegis destroyers are designed to make CSGs
retreat or render them inoperable. More specifically, this passage of the Second
Artillery doctrine describes
• “Firepower harassment [strikes]” (火力袭扰), which involve hitting “carrier
battle groups.”
• “Frontal firepower deterrence” (前方火力慑阻), which involves firing
intimidation salvos in front of a CSG’s advance “to serve as a warning.”
• “Flank firepower expulsion” (翼侧火力驱赶), which combines interception
of a CSG by PLAN forces with intimidation salvos “launched toward the
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enemy carrier battle group opposite our relatively threatened flank” to force
it away from the vulnerable area.
• “Concentrated fire assault” (集火突击), which entails targeting the carrier
as a center of flight operations: “When many carrier-borne aircraft are used
in continuous air strikes against our coast, in order to halt the powerful air
raids, the enemy’s core carrier should be struck as with a ‘heavy hammer.’
The conventional missile forces should be a select group carrying sensitive
penetrating submunitions and, using the ‘concentrated firepower assault’
method, a wide-coverage strike against the enemy’s core carrier should be
executed, striving to destroy the enemy’s carrier-borne planes, the control
tower [island] and other easily damaged and vital positions.”
• “Information assault” (信息攻击), which entails attacking the carrier strike
group’s command and control system electromagnetically to disable it:
“Directed against the enemy’s command and control system or weak links in
the Aegis system, conventional missiles carrying antiradiation submunitions
or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) submunitions can be used when enemy
radar is being used and their command systems are working, with antiradiation submunitions striking radar stations and EMP submunitions paralyzing
the enemy’s command and control system.”38
A third document, Intimidation Warfare, edited by Lieutenant General Zhao
Xijun, Second Artillery deputy commander from 1996 to 2003, echoes many
of the statements on strategic signaling outlined in Science of Second Artillery
Campaigns. It sheds additional light on China’s possible calculus and tactics in
various scenarios. Zhao’s team emphasizes the value of demonstration training,
tests, and other measures to influence the enemy, in part by influencing media
coverage.39
Zhao’s team also suggests four methods to deter enemy ships without hitting
them directly. “Proximity . . . sea deterrence strike” involves test launches that
impact near a sea-based target. “Two-flanked convergence proximity (or critical) deterrence strike [两翼夹击抵近 (临界) 威慑打击]” involves launching two
or more missiles to bracket or encircle a target. “Island crossing attack deterrence strike [越岛攻击威慑打击]” exploits the psychological impact of missiles
overflying “strategic targets” when fighting an enemy controlling an island (e.g.,
Taiwan?). “Proximity aircraft carrier deterrence strike [抵近航空威慑打击]”
involves “the launching of missiles toward the flanks or the front of the aircraft
carrier battle groups that have entered one’s territorial waters, [to] demonstrate
one’s ability and resolve to implement destructive strikes against the aircraft
carrier, thereby producing psychological shocks in the enemy and forcing it to
leave one’s territorial waters.”40
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Particularly noteworthy of the wide variety of uses suggested for ASBMs
against carriers and possibly other surface vessels in this publication and in Science of Second Artillery Campaigns is that at least several would appear to place
less of a premium on warhead accuracy, depending on how literally such concepts as bracketing and encirclement are interpreted. Rather, missile range and
defense penetration capability would seem to be the key factors. If a MaRV were
known to defeat terminal defenses and a demonstration shot defeated the SM-3
interceptor,* only guidance failure would seem to stand in the way of a successful Chinese strike.
Science of Second Artillery Campaigns states that TBMs extend the Second
Artillery’s strike range, and it seems to assume that the Second Artillery would
have ASBM inventory sufficient to permit numerous warning shots. Horizontal
escalation in the short run, it argues implicitly, can achieve de-escalation in the
long run. Although the Second Artillery’s view is that such tactics would be effective, unless it were communicated effectively ahead of time that these were
merely warning shots, they could easily be misinterpreted as failed attempts to
strike the target and thus have the exact opposite result of China’s intent—that
is, escalation instead of de-escalation. This potential problem is addressed, in
a fashion, in Science of Second Artillery Campaigns: one section emphasizes the
need for “no-fly” and “restricted navigation zones” and calls for the use of “very
precise missiles in order to prevent errors in precision or losing control of the
missile when it is in flight such that it enters enemy territory (or an enemyoccupied island), or such that it directly strikes an enemy aircraft carrier.” Otherwise, such errors “could cause the nature of deterrence to change, giving the
enemy an excuse to use force.”41
Technical Sources
Having considered how the Second Artillery thinks about using ASBMs, it is
time to examine in detail possible approaches to, and technical challenges in,
developing them. The Second Artillery dominates available technical ASBM assessments, implying that it may largely control any Chinese ASBM programs. As
the PLA’s strategic rocket force, with “equal attention devoted to” (and the vast
majority of its recent acquisitions in) conventional forces, and 78.2 percent of its
cadres now holding bachelor’s degrees or above, it would seem the logical choice
to handle such a challenging new mission.42 The vast majority of available technical articles devoted explicitly to ASBM issues are authored in full or in part by
individuals associated with the Second Artillery Engineering College in Xi’an,
suggesting that this institution may be playing a major role in developing ASBMrelated programs. Technical analyses also come from civilian institutions in
* The RIM-161 naval surface-launched anti–ballistic missile interceptor, a variant of the U.S. Navy’s Standard Missile (SM) series.
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Xi’an, itself a major defense industry hub, as well, implying some division of
intellectual labor.43 The most prolific contributor is the PLA-uniformed civilian
Tan Shoulin, a leading professor at the Second Artillery Engineering College in
the Department of Command and Support, who advises master’s students and
specializes in “missile weapon firepower applications.”
Second in institutional prominence is the Second Artillery Equipment Department, in Beijing—with some related publication by the Second Artillery
Equipment Research Institute as well. Such involvement may suggest that some
degree of procurement, or at least active consideration thereof, is under way.
Occasional participation can also be seen from individuals associated with units
presumably associated with Second Artillery bases. Such strategic locations as
Taiyuan, with its Military Representative Office in Factory 247, also make appearances. Academic institutions in other places—such as the National University of Defense Science and Technology in Changsha and the Beijing Institute of
Technology’s School of Aerospace Science and Engineering—appear to make
contributions as well.
Chinese researchers are studying the problems of target tracking and terminal guidance associated with ASBMs. Technical studies, such as a recent paper
by State Oceanic Administration scientists on using synthetic-aperture radar to
detect surface ships, suggest that the Chinese have developed substantial expertise in the use of such hardware.44 A recent paper by researchers at Dalian Naval
Academy offers a regimen of tests and data fusion to “achieve our goals of monitoring and identifying ships in large-scale sea areas by using space-borne optical
sensors.”45 A study by researchers at Beijing Institute of Technology simulates
terminal targeting of a moving aircraft carrier using adjoint equations and nondimensional analysis but states that guidance precision-enhancing technologies
still need to be developed.46 A mathematical study by researchers at the Second
Artillery Engineering College appears designed to demonstrate conceptual feasibility.47 Researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering College and Second
Artillery Base 55, Unit 96311, Huaihua (Jingzhou), offer a theoretical exploration of the ability of TBMs with terminal-phase guidance and maneuvering capabilities to attack aircraft carriers.48
Researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering College and the National
Defense Science and Technology University offer a mathematical model of a
type of terminal guidance, based on a prediction model of a carrier’s movement.
Modeling suggests that this method can allow warhead precision to achieve a
CEP* of about twelve meters under the most ideal conditions.49

* Circular error probability—broadly, the distance from an aim point within which a missile has a 50 percent
probability of striking.
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In a related paper, researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering College
and the Second Artillery Equipment Department present a model for predicting
the movement of a CSG that can provide targeting information for land-based
TBMs. For the needs of TBM targeting, it would be sufficient to provide predictions with a precision measured in kilometers within a time frame of “tens of
minutes.” The paper demonstrates the feasibility of such a forecast system and
provides two maps depicting the notional location of an aircraft carrier southsoutheast of Taiwan, at the latitude of Hainan Island.50
How to cause maximum damage to a carrier most effectively is another common research topic.51 For example, a PhD and a master’s student at the Second
Artillery Engineering College offer a theoretical model for calculating damage
effects on large targets with many components—say, a carrier strike group.52
The discussions in a large proportion of technical articles focus on the delivery
of submunitions by homing ballistic missiles to disable flight operations from
carriers, while not addressing directly the problems of target acquisition and
guidance. Research on submunitions appears to be extremely widespread and
sophisticated, with many writings on how to use them against carrier-based
aircraft and against runways at air bases (e.g., those of Taiwan). A pathbreaking U.S. article by William S. Murray provides compelling evidence that the
Second Artillery has already developed considerable competence in the latter
mission.53
Defeating U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) is also seen by many Chinese
researchers as essential to attacking a carrier strike group successfully, and it has
attracted considerable study.54 Researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering
College offer a theoretical model of reentry-vehicle maneuvering using “moving
mass center” control methods. This involves changing the center of gravity of
a warhead by adjusting movable masses within the warhead, thereby modifying its atmospheric flight path. The aerodynamic profi le of the warhead would
remain unchanged, and the method can be used in conjunction with fins and
other conventional control surfaces.55
Technical experts working on technical solutions are focused on very narrow, specific issues. One wonders, however, whether their political leaders have
“gamed out” the scenarios and considered the consequences as technical capabilities progress. The danger with a lopsided focus is that without a proper
understanding of the potential strategic risks involved, technical achievements
can have dangerous consequences. According to some interpretations, China’s
11 January 2007 antisatellite test offers a cautionary example of Beijing’s civilian
leadership approving the trial of a weapon long in development without understanding fully its scope or strategic ramifications.56
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Whatever the exact strategic calculations (or lack thereof) of the political
leadership (authoritative sources are silent on the point), the ASBM issue has
been vigorously debated by Chinese commentators in various unofficial venues.
Some of these individuals may be privy to internal deliberations or even play
roles in shaping policy, particularly in specialized subject areas. When politics
or bureaucratic maneuvering comes to the fore, they may become caught up in
larger competitions of ideas. But even the views of those not directly involved in
the policy process often matter; their ideas may inform policy makers directly
or even be adopted. Some analyses may well be informed by parallel debates in
official circles, and even be designed to help justify or “socialize” already established policies—for instance, through didactic exploration of important concepts. For that, we turn to the generalist literature.
Generalist Literature
Though, as we have seen, the doctrinal literature is the most demonstrably
authoritative category of open-source writings, with technical literature often
roughly equivalent, care must be taken in extrapolating actual capabilities from
these sources. Available Second Artillery technical articles and mathematical
feasibility studies devoted explicitly to ASBM issues do not detail concrete Chinese capabilities.57 Even doctrine may reflect aspirations or projected capabilities rather than the existence of hardware and infrastructure. In fact, Chinese
doctrinal publications often discuss theoretical capabilities as if they existed,
which U.S. joint publications typically do not.
For all these reasons, it is useful to examine the less clearly authoritative but
more diverse and detailed generalist literature, with its widespread debate on all
major aspects of ASBM development and employment, for indications of challenges and dilemmas that China might face. Regardless of the actual status of
Chinese ASBM development, these opinions matter: perfecting and deploying
such a weapon would entail resolving a wide variety of complexities and policy
considerations and transcending many industrial and bureaucratic boundaries.
Any remaining challenges in the technical data fusion required for ASBM guidance and targeting may pale in comparison to the bureaucratic “data fusion”
needed if such a program is to succeed over time and such a weapon is to function effectively in combat.58
Strategic Rationale and Scenarios. There is broad (though not complete) consistency in the generalist literature concerning the operational effects of ASBMs and their
potential value for Chinese maritime strategy writ large. Antiship ballistic missiles
are promoted as a means to overcome conventional inferiority (by exploiting technological asymmetry), deter intervention, give China more maneuvering space, and
offer both escalation control and an “assassin’s mace” for victory if deterrence fails.
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Of supreme importance to Beijing is Taiwan’s political status. At the strategic level, Beijing seeks to deter Taipei from declaring independence, progressively constrain its political space, and encourage eventual reunification, with a
wide variety of hard- and soft-power tools. Tactical ballistic missiles are thought
by one analyst to offer China a “third” alternative to the risk of engaging in
outright attack, on one hand, and the limitations of soft power, on the other.
Termed “attacking without entering,” a TBM campaign is seen by this observer
as increasing China’s strategic options while limiting Taiwan’s.59 In addition to
their psychological and deterrent effects, ASBMs (as a category of tactical ballistic missiles) are believed to offer China a way to exert hard-power pressure
and convey strategic signals in scenarios that do not rise to the level of war. This
would seem in concert with Chinese strategic writings, which often express considerable confidence that China can manage strategic escalation in measured
increments with a high degree of certainty. At the operational level, facing the
possibility of intervention by a technologically more advanced navy in the event
of a Taiwan conflict, the PLA seeks an asymmetric “silver bullet” that will (ideally) forestall intervention in the first place or, in a worst-case scenario, offer the
ability to attack platforms that are perceived to threaten China. Antiship ballistic missiles promise to further this strategy at far lower cost than force-on-force
approaches. Three PLA officers from the Second Artillery Command College
declare that “guided missile forces are the silver bullet for achieving victory in
limited high-technology war.”60
A professor and a student at the Air Force Engineering Academy evoke an
analogous concept when they write that ballistic missiles enjoy a higher probability of penetration than other antiaccess weapons: “Tactical ballistic missiles”
have become “the ‘poor country’s atom bomb.’”61
In addition, TBMs are regarded by their proponents as an important instrument in China’s overall strategic tool kit. One of the most nuanced analyses on
the issue, an article published in the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
(CSIC) journal Shipborne Weapons, states that tactical missiles “provide China
with more maneuvering space for military and political strategic operations on
its eastern, maritime flank.”62 More specifically, the creation of a
tactical ballistic missile maritime strike system . . . will establish for China in any
high-intensity conflict in its coastal waters an asymmetry, in its favor, in the deliverance of firepower and so will remedy to some extent China’s qualitative inferiority in traditional naval platforms. Further, the existence of this asymmetry would
set up for both sides a psychological “upper limit” on the scale of conflict. This
would enable both parties to return more easily “to rationality,” thereby creating
more space for maneuver in the resolution of maritime conflicts.63
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Skeptics writing in another CSIC publication, Modern Ships, by contrast, reject both of these points, arguing that ASBMs offer limited power-projection
capabilities, are highly escalatory if employed, and might in fact trigger nuclear
retaliation.64
How Chinese strategists assess the impact of ASBMs for various conflict scenarios is far more difficult to evaluate. Few articles address this topic. One that
does states that “the PLA must use all of its electronic warfare and reconnaissance assets properly, must neutralize enemy antimissile systems and missile
sensor systems, and should use electronic jamming on the enemy fleet. Such
combined kinetic and electronic attacks help the PLA attack an enemy fleet . . .
with a combination of explosive, antiradiation, and fake warheads to deceive
enemy radar and sensor systems and defeat a deployed battle group or one in
port.”65
A 2007 article offers a minutely detailed scenario of a notional attack sequence. But it is divorced from larger strategic events, based on some questionable assumptions, and written by a journalist with no professional background
in defense affairs.66 No known sources mention directly any scenarios beyond
Taiwan.
In any case, the concept hinges on technical feasibility (the subject of the
next section of this article). Chinese discussions of ASBM employment typically
center on their use to deny U.S. carrier strike groups access to waters relevant to
a Taiwan conflict, presumably to the east of the island, and hence to the airspace
over the strait and even over the island itself. The idea seems to be to hold carriers back through deterrence and to attack them if they come forward.
At the same time, ASBMs are recognized to have significant limitations, even
potential dangers. According to one analyst, they “cannot replace aircraft carriers, submarines, and other traditional naval weapons”: they “can be used to
destroy enemy forces at sea but not to achieve absolute sea control, let alone to
project maritime power.”67 Two writers in Modern Ships go much farther, declaring that while ASBMs are technically possible, their employment in practice is
fraught with difficulties. These can be overcome, in their view, if one is dealing
with a minor power, but not with a superpower like the United States.68 One
claim they make, as have others, is that reducing the speed of the warhead in
the terminal reentry phase in order to operate its guidance radar makes it more
vulnerable to anti–ballistic missile interceptors. To some extent this depends
on one’s assessment of the maneuverability of the warhead in its terminal entry
phase, but the authors of the Modern Ships article are highly skeptical. They
acknowledge that the problem may be overcome to some extent in a saturated
attack, but they insist that the Aegis defense system is designed to deal with just
that. They also point to the relatively high costs of ballistic missiles. Further,
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they suggest that the use of ballistic missiles in a saturation attack would “likely
lead to the scenario described by ancient Chinese strategists, in which the weapon in question becomes unusable in practice” because its use would be highly
escalatory: “Apply little force, and no real harm can be done to the enemy; apply
great force, and the first harm is done to the self.”69
Even if ASBMs were indeed successfully developed, by virtue of an overwhelming investment of resources and energy, the Modern Ships authors contend, a critical problem would remain: whether anyone would dare use such
weapons in an actual conflict scenario.70 The authors seem to suggest that while
conventional tactical missiles could be used against Taiwan with little risk,
their employment against U.S. carriers would immediately create a grave political problem: “Since the introduction of nuclear weapons, all the major nuclear
powers have developed ballistic missile warning systems against possible nuclear attacks, and there has not been a single precedent of a major nuclear power
attacking another with ballistic missiles.”71 As no technology today is capable of
distinguishing between a conventional and a nuclear warhead prior to detonation upon impact, the authors worry that any ballistic-missile attack against
another nuclear power might activate its strategic retaliation mechanisms and
trigger a nuclear conflict. The Modern Ships authors emphasize that in any conflict scenario, the extreme psychological duress to which the military personnel
of both sides would be subjected would make it particularly dangerous to employ ballistic missiles, as any small mistake in judgment might trigger a nuclear
Armageddon.72 Even absent any misperception, sinking a ship that is a symbol
of American power and has a crew of thousands could provoke a very serious
response. Of course, elements of the PLA, and even their civilian leaders in a crisis, might be less cautious than these analysts. Another writer, having reviewed
their performance in battle since the 1960s, concludes that TBMs are indeed, as
others have argued, an “assassin’s mace,” a silver bullet.73 A Chinese interlocutor
has told one of the present authors that the Second Artillery is itself considering
placing nuclear and conventional warheads interchangeably on the same types
of missiles—for example, the DF-21—so that they will “possess both nuclear
and conventional [核常兼备]” capabilities. This last may be evidence of open
debate, of manipulation of American opinion, or of sensitization of the United
States to operational implications. If the latter, there is a clear risk of misperceptions in the event of launch in a conflict.
The question of operational control is not addressed directly in the open
sources, but the content of doctrinal publications, the large number of Second
Artillery officers writing on the topic, and the current responsibility of that arm
for the vast majority of nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles suggest that
the Second Artillery is likely to have sole responsibility for ground-based ASBMs.
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FIGURE 4
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF ASBM FLIGHT TRAJECTORY WITH MIDCOURSE AND TERMINAL
GUIDANCE
Apogee of missile
flight trajectory
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Note the depiction of control fins on the reentry vehicle, which would be critical to steering the ASBM through terminal maneuvers to evade countermeasures
and home in on a moving target. This makes an ASBM different from most ballistic missiles, which have a fixed trajectory. Published by individuals affiliated
with the Second Artillery Engineering College and a Second Artillery base in a Chinese technical journal.
Source: Tan Shoulin, Zhang Daqiao, and Diao Guoxiu, “Determination and Evaluation of Effective Range for Terminal Guidance Ballistic Missile(s) Attacking
Aircraft Carrier(s),” pp. 6–9, republished in Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, Annual Report to
Congress, p. 21.

(The possibility of rivalry and divergence of viewpoints that may result between
the Second Artillery and the PLAN will be addressed later in this article.)
Technological Feasibility: Convergence and Divergence of Views. Chinese doctrinal debates about the utility of ASBMs are closely related to widespread disagreements over their technical feasibility. Analysts generally concur that five
major technical challenges must be surmounted to achieve a functioning ASBM:
detection, tracking, penetration of target defenses, hitting a moving target, and
causing sufficient damage (figure 4).
Detection: Pessimists claim that carriers are too small relative to the potential
search area to be easily detected by satellite images. Optimists maintain that
carriers—with their broad constellation of electromagnetic signals—can be detected in a variety of ways, such as with space-borne sensors.
Tracking: Skeptics maintain that requisite satellite coverage is unattainable,
as are sufficient naval vessels and surveillance craft, as well as overseas bases
for signals intelligence. They believe that China’s other tracking methods are
inadequate, even in aggregate. Strangely, they seem to overlook the possibility
that China’s combination of land-based radars and satellites—perhaps augmented temporarily with deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles and launches
of (micro)satellites—might be sufficient to track and target carrier strike groups
within a certain zone off China’s coastal waters from which it believed essential

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss4/6

18

Erickson and Yang: Using the Land to Control the Sea?—Chinese Analysts Consider the
E R I C K S O N & YA N G

71

to exclude them in combat.74 Both Chinese and Western sources, for instance,
suggest that China already has relevant over-the-horizon (OTH) backscatter
sky-wave and OTH surface-wave radars.75
Target defense penetration: The claims of skeptics that slowing the warhead
for terminal guidance makes it prohibitively vulnerable to interception seem
unpersuasive based on known physics principles. A wide variety of Chinese
sources suggest using multiaxis saturation attacks (e.g., involving submarinelaunched cruise missiles as well) to overwhelm CSG defenses, apparently without acknowledging the difficulty of coordinating them.
Hitting a moving target: How to strike a CSG that moves during the processes
of location, data transmission, and ASBM delivery? Skeptics contend that ballistic missiles are less accurate than cruise missiles and that while a ballistic
missile’s trajectory is fi xed, its target is mobile and may escape between launch
and impact. But researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering College maintain that as long as the initial ASBM trajectory is reasonably accurate, appropriate homing corrections can be made. Other researchers suggest improving
precision with passive radiation homing and by activating terminal guidance at
higher altitude to allow the seeker to scan a larger sea area. One researcher recommends selecting opportune moments for attack: “Even a tiger takes a nap [老
虎也有打盹的时候].”76 Thus, they contend, carriers can be targeted when flight
operations or at-sea replenishment impede their mobility.
Causing sufficient damage: While a few experts make a show of detailing carrier damage-control equipment, one wonders from their tone if they are not
being a bit disingenuous. The conventional wisdom seems to be that a multiaxis
saturation attack (to defeat defenses) or submunitions (to distribute damage),
delivered accurately, can achieve a mission kill by targeting critical exposed areas, such as the carrier’s aircraft, island, or C4ISR* equipment.
ASSESSMENTS
Available Chinese literature follows a logical pattern of ever-widening concentric circles of awareness and, to a lesser extent, involvement. This supports the
axiom that the longer something goes on, the more likely people are to hear
about it. At the center, authoritative PLA publications assume an (eventual?)
ASBM capability. Farther out, a variety of institutes are working to validate specific concepts and perhaps also technologies to support such a capability. Beyond these inner circles, a wide range of individuals, whose access to internal
information probably varies markedly, are beginning to weigh in with diverse
opinions and institutional interests. Few writers in the generalist literature make
a balanced, nonpartisan argument along the lines that ASBMs are feasible but
* Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
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a bad idea or a good idea but technically infeasible. This suggests a general pattern of institutional biases and competition, with individuals favoring precisely
the outcomes that would benefit their organizations most. These opinions and
interests matter. Many of the projections of technological “hurdles” outlined
above are either demonstrably pessimistic or will likely be obviated anyway over
the next few years as China continues its rapid aerospace development. Rather,
China’s ASBM future may be a policy, not a technical, question. For now, as capabilities are being developed, technical discussion is being elevated to strategic
discussion, but that could well change if Beijing’s leaders ask one day: Now that
we have an ASBM capability, what can we do with it?
Nonetheless, debate continues in China’s generalist literature over the technical feasibility of ASBM operations, with only two writers claiming directly that
China has ASBM capabilities.77 This may suggest that there is ongoing disagreement in China concerning how to develop these weapons at present and how
they could best be placed into operation. Now that China has what could be
termed a public and military-intellectual complex, organizations, analysts and
policy entrepreneurs may be jockeying for position in an attempt to influence
the course of decision making on the part of at least two of China’s armed services, its military leadership, and ultimately its civilian authorities.
The overall discussion seen so far is best characterized as “contentious.” The
three technical challenges most consistently emphasized are real-time satellite
reconnaissance, target tracking in terminal reentry, and terminal maneuvering.
Some problems that are presented as insurmountable by some analysts are approached more sanguinely by others. Foreign subject-matter experts could glean
significant insights from the multitude of relevant Chinese technical studies.
Particularly noteworthy is that direct claims of existing Chinese capabilities
in these areas are extremely limited. In other words, the focus of the discussion is on feasibility rather than actual Chinese capabilities. Researchers at the
Second Artillery Engineering College make a variety of feasibility claims, in
one instance stating specifically that the technical hurdles to successful ASBM
employment have already been resolved, but they cite English-language technical papers as authority for this particular point (though they use sophisticated
Chinese sources to support other details of their argument).78 Again, they emphasize technical feasibility without reference to current Chinese capabilities. It
is likely that some Chinese authors do not know what those capabilities actually
are, while others cannot say.
Several other issues, though not directly addressed by the Chinese authors
surveyed, may merit further attention.
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Possible Interservice Rivalry
A noticeable pattern in the tone of ASBM analyses may be interpreted as signs
of Second Artillery–PLAN bureaucratic competition. Momentum, direction,
and contention about programs may reflect diverse institutional interests. The
Second Artillery produces many technical analyses, but not a single one appears
pessimistic. Articles written by analysts and students associated with the Second
Artillery tend to take the feasibility of ASBM development for granted, perhaps
because an ASBM program would be (or now is) controlled by the Second Artillery, thereby furthering its institutional interests.
By contrast, the vast majority of analyses affi liated with the PLAN and the
state shipbuilding industry suggest that ASBM development is technically problematic or that use would have dangerous unintended consequences.79 Perhaps
this is because ground-launched ASBMs would not be controlled by the navy
and could divert resources otherwise earmarked for naval development. The
PLAN may also be lobbying hard to begin serious aircraft carrier development
of its own and does not want this effort undermined by constant emphasis on
carrier vulnerabilities—which have played a major role in previous Chinese carrier discussions, at least at the generalist level. We may thus be witnessing some
elements of Chinese bureaucratic resource-allocation politics, cloaked in strategic debate and the flag.
In an interesting suggestion of at least some cooperation between the Second
Artillery and the PLAN on antiship ballistic missiles, however, an individual
from the Navy Representative Office in Chengdu, Sichuan, is a coauthor with researchers from the Second Artillery Engineering College on two ASBM-specific
articles. This is precisely the sort of interaction that one would expect if the
Second Artillery were charged with directly developing and testing an ASBM,
in which case the PLAN would second representatives to relevant Second Artillery facilities to make sure that weapons produced addressed PLAN needs.80
Moreover, such PLAN-affi liated institutions as the Dalian Naval Academy and
the State Oceanographic Administration conduct extensive research on related
topics like ship detection and tracking.
Pressing questions remain, however. What role would the PLAN play in operations that clearly affect its geographic area of responsibility? How would
joint operations be coordinated among the Second Artillery, the PLAN, and
other services—particularly given the PLA’s previous limited ability in joint
operations?
Cost-Effectiveness
Beijing’s actual development and deployment of ASBMs, and implications for
any bureaucratic competition between the Second Artillery and the PLAN, will
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also hinge on decision makers’ perceptions of their relative efficacy and costeffectiveness (e.g., vis-à-vis cruise missiles), as well as their marginal development cost. The relative cost-effectiveness of various antiaccess weapons can be
derived from both physical principles and Western and Soviet experience, both
of which have been widely discussed in open literature.
Many Chinese analysts have regarded such traditional weapons as attack submarines and antiship cruise missiles as the primary weapons against carriers,
with no more than cursory references to ASBMs. Other Chinese sources claim
that cruise missiles are superior to ballistic missiles for certain missions, particularly in terms of general use, agility, and target selection. According to the
U.S. defense analyst Thomas Mahnken, cruise missiles have many advantages
over ballistic missiles for a country like China: they are cheaper, it is easier to
make them highly accurate, they require simpler launch platforms and support
equipment, and they “approach their targets from different azimuths than ballistic missiles [and] hug the ground.”81 Further, cruise missiles can be delivered
by aircraft, as well as by ships, submarines, and ground launchers.
ASBM advocates make several strong points, however. Cruise missiles have
a variety of disadvantages, including the much longer time of flight (with obvious targeting implications); the need to fly long ranges at high altitudes, where
they are much more vulnerable to being shot down; conversely, low operational
ceilings at long ranges (thus making it harder to fly over mountains, such as Taiwan’s); shorter maximum ranges than ballistic missiles; and difficulty in identifying targets correctly. In an interesting example of PLAN-affi liated individuals
claiming that ASBMs have advantages, researchers from the Naval Aeronautical
Engineering Academy use mathematical analysis to calculate that “when using
ballistic missiles to carry out attack operations on [naval vessel formations], the
probability of penetration can reach 95%.” This is a much higher success rate
than those they calculate for cruise missiles.82
Antiship cruise missiles must often be fired from aircraft, surface vessels,
or submarines that approach close to enemy forces to compensate for reduced
range. This, and their relatively long flight times, increases their vulnerability
(albeit less so for submarine launches), and hence also their cost. However, the
ASCM shooters themselves are not necessarily more expensive just because they
are vulnerable and might be lost in combat; some (e.g., the Type 022 Houbei
missile catamaran) are likely considered disposable, with loss in combat assumed. A mobile land-based ASBM, though requiring substantial development
and infrastructure investment, would be much less vulnerable to destruction
before launch. Two Chinese observers estimate the unit cost of an ASBM and its
launcher to be $5–$10.5 million—several times that of the most expensive U.S.
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cruise missiles if their launch platform is not included, but far less than the cost
of interceptors to defeat it.83
Other Chinese authors have addressed the cost-effectiveness issue only in
passing. One analyst insists that cost-effectiveness should not be understood
along conventional lines in such conflict scenarios and that if the technology
is indeed feasible, the cost issue will not necessarily be so salient.84 The discussion is often interwoven with analyses of which weapons can best target aircraft
carriers. Here, the primary comparison is between ASBMs and cruise missiles.
One analyst states that “ballistic missiles, given the same tactical parameters,
offer more outstanding penetration capability and cost-effectiveness than cruise
missiles,” both of which are superior to aircraft in this regard.85 This assessment is augmented by another observer, who states that “supersonic antiship
guided missiles that use ramjet engines are not very useful due to their restricted
ranges.” Moreover, “it will be very difficult to surpass or even catch up to the
United States and Russia in developing cruise missiles. Thus, it will be very difficult for our cruise missiles to become a deadly weapon to carry out fatal attacks
against aircraft carrier formations.”86 Chinese planners may therefore favor development of ASBMs as a means of “poor man’s sea denial,” over such complex,
expensive approaches as a fleet of aircraft carriers and accompanying long-range
aircraft.87
A Coercive Quarantine?
Synthesizing the considerations above, it is possible that to the extent that tactical ballistic missiles are employed as antiship weapons, they would most likely
be used as part of a multiservice combined-arms operation, as an added component of a saturation attack to overwhelm the carrier’s defensive systems. For this
purpose, targeting precision would not be as important, and the more general
Chinese tradition of numbers over accuracy could be employed to good effect.
While coordinating such an attack would be complex and difficult, there could
be significant benefits if such issues could be surmounted. If a carrier detected
an incoming ballistic missile, it would likely engage it with its air-defense assets
regardless of the attacking missile’s presumed accuracy. This could divert carrier defense systems from other threats, such as other ASBMs or simultaneous
cruise missile volleys, and perhaps exhaust scarce interceptors. To escape this
problem, carriers may opt to stay out of the range of the TBMs. As one analyst
writing in the Kanwa Asian Defense Review puts it, “For the Chinese military
forces, the practical significance of striking the aircraft carrier lies in that the
attacks can play the role of ‘coercive [quarantine]’ even if the missiles cannot
[always] accurately hit the targets, that is, to keep the U.S. aircraft carrier battle
groups out of the Taiwan Strait combat theater.”88

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009

23

Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 4, Art. 6
76

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R EV I EW

Messages for the U.S. Military?
How and to what extent might Beijing be seeking to influence strategic communications regarding ASBMs? Information manipulation should certainly be expected; discussion is likely regulated to send a desired signal. This is in keeping with
the attention to deception and perception management outlined in a variety of
PLA publications, including Science of Second Artillery Campaigns.89 Within such
a conception, different explanations for Chinese writings on ASBMs are possible;
to the extent that they are manipulated, they could represent, respectively, a highly
cost-effective partial deterrent until the capability is fully realized, a reflection of
ongoing ambivalence and debate, a targeted effort to obscure actual capabilities,
or a statement of conditional intent.
Strategic articles might well be manipulated to obscure or divert attention
from an extant capability or one in rapid development. Consider the sheer volume of highly specific Chinese technical writings from a wide variety of important civilian and military institutes over the past decade—seemingly on all
areas of direct relevance to ASBM development and even use—virtually all of
them stating that various component capabilities are either under development
or at least technically feasible. Manipulating a few strategic articles in journals
known to be read outside China, by comparison, might be a particularly effective instrument in an information campaign. It is even possible that there is an
effort to send a measured signal—that China may be preparing certain capabilities but has not yet made definitive plans for their deployment, the actual
realization of which will be calibrated in response to American strategic actions
(e.g., vis-à-vis Taiwan).
In any case, should its capabilities be developed sufficiently, Beijing might
emulate former Second Artillery deputy commander Lieutenant General Zhao
Xijun’s logic and reveal a dramatic weapon test to the world—with or without advance warning—in some way geared to influencing official and public
opinion in the United States, Taiwan, and Japan. Such an unprecedented public
demonstration could be used to signal either growing Chinese power during a
time of stability or Beijing’s resolve in a time of diplomatic tension or crisis.90
Alternatively, unpublicized flight tests could be conducted to deter foreign militaries without alarming foreign publics (though classified information might
ultimately be leaked to them).
In any case, some sort of flight tests would be necessary to generate Chinese
confidence in ASBM capabilities. The fact of a hit, however manipulated and
revealed, could change the strategic equation—much as the efficacy of the 20–21
July 1921 test-bombing of the battleship Ostfriesland was hotly contested by the
U.S. Navy (and remains debated to this day) yet altered service budgets immediately and helped catalyze development of what later became the U.S. Air Force.
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Is there today a Chinese equivalent of Brigadier General Billy Mitchell eager to
promote such a test to further the cause of Second Artillery and China’s pioneering of new ways of war?
However the Chinese internal debate on ASBM development progresses, the
strategic stakes will be high; this will be a debate worth following.
IMPLICATIONS
While there is ongoing disagreement as to their feasibility and efficacy, the idea of
developing antiship ballistic missiles is clearly appealing to many in China, particularly in the Second Artillery. Any successful Chinese deployment of ASBMs
would likely influence PLA thinking by
• Reinforcing continental approaches to maritime security—“using the land to
control the sea”
• Reinforcing centralized approaches to command
• Increasing emphasis on multiaxis saturation attacks
• Increasing confidence in China’s ability to restrict U.S. Navy operations, and
to control escalation.
All does not hinge on putative ASBM capability: demonstration of other antiaccess capabilities (e.g., streaming antiship cruise missile attacks) that a technologically capable nation like China is clearly capable of mastering could have
substantial effect. But ASBMs pose a threat qualitatively different from that of
antiship cruise missiles: the United States has not had decades to address the
problem, interception is far more complex and time sensitive, and launch platforms cannot be targeted (“shooting the archer instead of the arrow”) without
contemplating highly escalatory strikes in mainland China.
Chinese leaders do not seek war. Rather, they want to defend what they perceive to be their nation’s core territorial interests and to ensure a stable environment for domestic economic development. If they develop an ASBM, then, they
would likely hope that it could prevent U.S. projection of military power in ways
that were inimical to China’s interests. They would thus hope to achieve deterrence without going to war. That said, America has its own national interests, including maintaining freedom of navigation, reassuring such key regional allies
as Japan and South Korea, preserving peace in the Taiwan Strait, and safeguarding Taiwan’s democracy. A demonstrated Chinese ASBM capability, particularly
if the Chinese side failed to offer explanations and reassurances, could threaten
these interests and be strategically destabilizing. This would necessitate American development and demonstration of robust countermeasures that Beijing
would come to regret.91
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Herein lies one more way in which Chinese open-source discussions of ASBMs
are significant, and must be addressed. Chinese public intellectuals are often
tasked by their government with making unofficial statements to gauge international response to potential initiatives, as was the case in December 2008 before a far more positive historic first—the PLAN’s counterpiracy deployment to
the Gulf of Aden. If some Chinese are currently sending such “trial balloons”
with regard to ASBM development, but U.S. interlocutors appear to be unaware,
distracted, or indifferent, this will only strengthen the hand of those pushing
such programs forward. Measured expression of U.S. concern, resolve, and capability, on the other hand, might influence Chinese decision-making regarding
ASBM development in a more positive direction—for example, by informing
and empowering the voices of government organizations with more to lose than
the Second Artillery in provoking the United States—or at least slow the pace to
give time for a more measured reaction. Just as American policy makers must
now discuss how best to prepare for this potential capability, they should work
to ensure that their Chinese counterparts have an analogous policy debate—in
parallel to the ongoing debate in open sources regarding whether China should
develop and deploy an ASBM, and the doctrinal and usage implications if it
does. While China will ultimately keep its own counsel, like any nation, such
efforts should at least ensure that any decisions in favor of ASBM development
are made with full awareness of the contingent costs, risks, and consequences.
To facilitate this process, two areas require particular investment of political
and human capital:
• Increased research to understand the trajectory of both Chinese ASBM
efforts and the attendant policy discourse92
• Bilateral strategic dialogue at all levels (particularly tracks 1.5 and 2).
Responding to the unprecedented strategic challenge presented by an ASBM
capability would require the American military and civilian leadership to face hard
truths, and continue to develop innovative new capabilities. The United States has
many options here, and it must be prepared to exercise them. The most perilous
approach would be to neglect such military innovation while continuing to insist
that the United States maintained its ability to keep the peace, when in fact the
military capabilities that underpin that ability were diminishing, at least in a relative sense. Such a discrepancy between rhetoric and reality would erode America’s
regional credibility and fuel Chinese overconfidence. The prospect of documenting that discrepancy publicly might motivate China to conduct a demonstration
of an ASBM; a successful test could create the impression that American powerprojection capabilities—and the regional credibility that depends on them—had
been dramatically diminished. Managing the proper response to this potential
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“game changer” will demand close scrutiny from scholars, analysts, and policy
makers alike, as it will critically influence America’s place in the Pacific for decades to come.
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